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Abstract 
The goal of this paper is to formulate several observations on the psychological relations 
between vita contemplativa and vita activa (hereafter, respectively, VC and VA) which 
manifest in the context of the two following problems: (1) what basic psychological mech-
anisms may propel an agent to forsake one type of life for the sake of another; and (2) 
what effect an agent’s deep involvement in VC may have for his attitude towards VA as 
well as for his manner of pursuing VA (if he decides to abandon VC and pursue this way 
of life). In the paper, the distinction is made between VC in the strong sense (metaphysi-
cally/religiously oriented) and VC in the weak sense, and it is argued, among others, that 
the two features of VC in the strong sense—selflessness and otherworldliness—make VC 
a desirable complement of VA (in its public form): the involvement in the public sphere 
motivated by VA is likely to be not only more effective, but also more durable than the 
involvement propelled by disappointment with the private VA. Therefore, human beings 
should not be thought of as (broadly) divided into two rarely interpermeating categories 
namely those who are ‘psychologically destined’ for VC and those who are ‘psychologi-
cally destined’ for VA. Rather, the opposite seems to be true, namely that there exist strong 
motivational links in the direction from VC to VA. 
Keywords: vita activa; vita contemplativa; disappointment; selflessness; private life; 
public life. 
 
1. Vita contemplativa and vita activa: Introductory Distinctions 
This paper is devoted to the analysis of two types of psychological relations between vita 
contemplativa and vita activa (hereafter, respectively, VC and VA), viz. those which man-
ifest in the context of the following two problems: (1) what basic psychological mecha-
nisms may propel an agent to forsake one type of life for the sake of another; and (2) what 
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effect an agent’s deep involvement in VC may have for his attitude towards VA as well as 
for his manner of pursuing VA (if he decides to abandon VC and pursue this way of life). 
Since the paper is focused on the psychological relations between VC and VA, it does not 
aim at providing any insights into the problem of the axiological relations between these 
two ways of life, i.e. into the problem of which of them is ‘better’ or ‘more valuable’. As 
will be shown, however, some conclusions regarding their mutual axiological relations 
can be derived from the psychological analyses.  
Even though the concepts of VC and VA have rather clear intuitive meanings (VC being 
a way of life detached from the affairs of everyday existence, focused on the contempla-
tion/pursuit of truth, while VA being a way of life engaged in worldly affairs, focused on 
realising various non-contemplative goals), some additional distinctions are indispensable. 
The first distinction concerns VC. This way of life may take two forms, which can be 
called ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, depending on the metaphysical assumptions accepted by those 
who decide to pursue it. The ‘strong’ form is anti- or supra-naturalistic: it assumes that 
nature is not all that exists and that what is not natural (and thereby is metaphysical) is the 
most proper object of contemplation. It does not imply that nature cannot be an object of 
contemplation, but it implies that whoever becomes seriously engaged in the contempla-
tion of nature (or in the pursuit of truth regarding nature), is bound to reach, at some stage 
of his contemplative activity, a higher object (e.g. Platonic ideas or the God/Abso-
lute/Logos). VC was understood in this way within the so-called classical (ancient and 
medieval) tradition of philosophy. Within this tradition, also some other elements of VC 
understood in this way were distinguished (cf. especially Pieper, 1998, pp. 73–110). They 
are worth mentioning as they will flesh out the somewhat general picture of VC in the 
strong sense presented so far:  
(1) The sole goal of VC is to become engaged in the process of attaining the truth 
and, more importantly, to contemplate the truth once it is attained; VC has no 
other, ulterior, motive; it is an approach to reality which is entirely disinterested, 
“altogether independent of all practical aims in active life” (Pieper, 1998, p. 74). 
(2) VC is a kind of knowing which is preceded or inspired by love; as Thomas Aqui-
nas put it in Scriptum super Sententiis (3 d. 35, I, 21), Ubi amor, ibi oculos 
(“Where love is, there is the eye”). Accordingly, it is the love of the reality 
(broadly understood as including its physical and metaphysical ‘side’) which un-
derlies contemplation; without this emotional condition which guarantees an 
‘openness’ towards the whole richness and complexity of reality, its cognition and 
contemplation is not possible. Even though amor is an (emotional) condition of 
contemplation, it does not appear sine ratio: amor itself requires a (cognitive) con-
dition, which Pieper aptly describes as the conviction that the “reality at bottom is 
good”—that “in spite of all appearances underlying all things is peace, salvation, 
gloria, that nothing and no one is lost (Pieper, 1998, p. 84)”. He adds that “such 
non-rational, intuitive certainties of the divine base of all that is can be vouchsafed 
to our gaze even when it is turned toward the most insignificant-looking things, if 
only it is a gaze inspired by love. That, in the precise sense, is contemplation” 
On the Relations between Vita Contemplativa and Vita Activa 
 
17 
(Pieper, 1998, p. 85). Thus, amor of reality—the condition of contemplation—
cannot appear if one does not have a “non-rational”, “intuitive” certainty that “re-
ality at bottom is good”—if, in other words, one is not open to the metaphysical, 
religious dimension of reality. But apart from amor of reality and its metaphysical 
basis (condition), the adherents of the classical (strong) view of VC point to one 
more (this time practical or psychological) precondition of contemplation, viz. lei-
sure (otium, schole), especially its internal element: “a proper mental and spiritual 
attitude”, which is opposed to that of acedia, and consists in the attitude of “non-
activity”, “inward calm”, “harmony”, “silence”, “the lack of restlessness” 
(cf. Pie⁠per, 2009, pp. 46–48); the external element of otium—viz. freedom from 
the fetters of everyday duties—is of lesser importance and does not constitute a 
necessary condition of contemplation (at least according to the Christian philoso-
phers, for the view of the ancient thinkers was different; most of them also em-
phasised the external element of leisure; the classical tradition is therefore not 
homogenous in this point).  
(3) From the above features of contemplation, the other two can be derived: contem-
plation is accompanied by amazement and constitutes the supreme happiness of 
a human being; as Thomas Aquinas wrote in Summa Contra Gentiles (3, 37), 
Ultimi hominis felicitas est in contemplatione veritatis. 
(4) Since the last stage (the acme) of VC is the contemplation—seeing, perception, 
theoria (in ancient Greek)—of the truth, not its pursuit, it is not surprising that 
the classical philosophers (e.g. Thomas Aquinas) emphasised that the mental fac-
ulty involved in it is intellectus (intuitive faculty) rather than ratio (discursive 
faculty); as Pieper metaphorically put it, summarising Aquinas’s view, “The sim-
ple insightful gaze of intellectus is related to the discursive movement of the ratio 
as the eternal to the temporal” (Pieper, 1998, p. 102). Accordingly, while ratio 
enables one to move to the object of contemplation, intellectus makes it possible 
to embrace it in one comprehensive view and ‘rest’ in it. The emphasis placed 
upon intellectus as a faculty of contemplation also explains why the condition of 
amor of reality, i.e. the certainty that “reality is at bottom good”, has a “non-
rational” character; it is “non-rational”, because it is (like contemplation itself) 
reached by intellectus, not by ratio. 
The strong form of VC described above must be distinguished from its weak form—nat-
uralistic and, thereby, deprived of its metaphysical, religious dimension. The essential el-
ements of the ‘metaphysical’ VC are absent here: VC is conceived of as a constant move 
towards the truth rather than as its contemplation (in the original sense of ‘seeing’); the 
pursued truth concerns the natural world and, therefore, does not necessarily lead to 
“amazement” (it cannot embrace metaphysical claims, such as that “reality is at bottom 
good” or that “the reality has divine base”). What is common for both forms of VC is that 
they represent a disinterested attitude to reality, i.e. the attitude of a spectator rather than 
that of an actor—of someone who desires to understand the world in the first place rather 
than act within it. One could ask whether the similarities between these two forms of VC 
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are strong enough to speak about VC in general and, consequently, analyse its relations to 
VA. In my view, the similarities are indeed strong enough for that purpose, although in 
my further analysis I shall not discount the importance of the differences between them. 
As for VA, it has two basic varieties. The first one is private; it consists in being focused 
on the matters from the narrow circle of one’s privacy, such as taking care of one’s children, 
spending time with friends, earning one’s living, producing and accumulating wealth. Typ-
ical of this way of life is the concentration on one’s private (including that of one’s kith and 
kin) happiness. Here I omit, as unnecessary for the analysis, further possible distinctions 
within this way of life, e.g. between ‘labour’ and ‘work’ as proposed by Hannah Arendt in 
her chef d’oeuvre The Human Condition. The second variety of VA is public (political) and 
it consists in stepping out of the narrow circle of one’s private matters into the public sphere 
in order to act for the sake of the public interest/good/happiness.  
In the remainder of this paper, I shall investigate two psychological problems mentioned at 
the beginning of this paper: that of the motivation to leave a given way of life and that of 
the effects of the involvement in VC for the subsequent pursuing of VA (in its public form). 
The analysis relies on the assumption that one cannot pursue all the ways of life simultane-
ously. At first sight, this assumption might seem implausible, since it is not difficult to 
imagine a person who shares his time more or less equally between contemplation, the 
involvement in public life, and the concern with the well-being of his own and his kith and 
kin. This objection can be easily refuted by pointing out two facts. First, a person leading 
such a multiform life undertakes a rather challenging task, because these different ways of 
life demand different types of mental attitude, and a really effective engagement in one of 
them can constitute a hindrance for an effective engagement in the other. Second, and more 
importantly, it seems that even a person who tries to pursue this multiform way of life 
(embracing VC and VA in its two varieties) and somehow succeeds in pursuing them ef-
fectively, creates (more or less consciously) some inner ‘ranking’ of them. As a result, even 
with regard to such person, one can reasonably speak about transitions between different 
ways of life (in this case a transition would mean a change in his ‘ranking’ of the ways of 
life). However, and I shall repeat this, owing to a radically different character of VC, private 
VA, and public VA, it seems that, as a rule, one of them distinctly dominates also in an 
external sense (expended quantity of time, energy, etc.) in a life of a given person, so the 
transition from one way of life to another takes, in the case of most people, a quite tangible 
form (manifesting in the change of behaviour). 
 
2. Disappointment as a Motive of ‘Shifting’ between Various Ways of Life 
In his short but penetrating study, titled Shifting Involvements: Private Interest and Public 
Action, Albert Hirschman advanced an insightful hypothesis that the main motive for 
“shifting” between two forms of VA is disappointment, which, in his view, is an important 
but unappreciated motive of human behaviour. He put it even more strongly, asserting that 
disappointment is a “central element of human experience” (Hirschman, 2002, p. 11); 
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since, as he claimed, “human nature is intrinsically unsatisfiable, insatiable (ibidem)”, we 
tend to expect too much from the reality and, as a result, we experience disappointment, a 
painful dissonance between desire and fulfilment. In this context, he invoked Kant’s sug-
gestive words from a letter to the Russian historian Nikolay Karamzin: “Give a man eve-
rything he desires and yet at this very moment he will feel that this everything is not 
everything”. Hirschman insightfully remarked that the converse feeling—that of a “pleas-
ant surprise” (for which, symptomatically, there is no one word)—is much less frequent, 
since reality seldom exceeds our expectations. He applied this original psychological hy-
pothesis to the analysis of VA, reaching the conclusion that disappointment is the main 
endogenous motive (i.e. one coming from the very nature of a respective variety of VA as 
confronted with the insatiability of human nature) of shifting between two types of VA 
and, thereby, between the private sphere and the public sphere (he obviously did not deny 
the existence and importance of exogenous motives); as he put it, “The turns from the 
private to the public life and back again are marked by wildly exaggerated expectations, 
by total infatuation and by sudden revulsions” (Hirschman, 2002, p. 102). In his view, the 
passage from the private to the public sphere is most likely to take place among people 
with high socio-economic status, because they have already achieved the private happiness 
(at least as they imagined it) and, because of the insatiability of human nature, became 
“disenchanted” with it (cf. Hirschman, 2002, p. 75). Needless to say, this kind of motiva-
tion may fail to lead to the actual transition, because one may encounter various ‘external’ 
difficulties (e.g. the collective action problems: it may make little sense to enter the public 
sphere alone and it may be difficult to coordinate the entrance with other people). The 
passage in the reverse direction—from the public sphere to the private sphere—is likely 
to take place, because, as Hirschman convincingly argued, it belongs to the nature of the 
public (political) sphere that it rarely offers an adequate (satisfactory) level of involve-
ment; it results in either over-involvement or under-involvement; “the problem with po-
litical life is that it is either too absorbing or too tame” (Hirschman, 2002, p. 119). One 
may therefore say that the passage to a different sphere of VA (leading to an oscillation 
between them) is mainly (if one focuses on endogenous motives only) a result of disap-
pointment: public life is “a relief from the boredom of the private life”, and private life is 
“a refuge from the paroxysms and futility of public endeavor” (Hirschman, 2002, p. 129). 
One could object, however, that Hirschman’s description of the motives for leaving a 
given type of VA (boredom in the case of private VA and enervation or the sentiment of 
futility in the case of public VA) are not necessary elements of these ways of life, but, 
rather, depend on the idiosyncrasies of individual psychology. One could imagine, so the 
objection goes, a person who could find full satisfaction in pursuing a given form of VA. 
Hirschman would disagree; in his view, all human beings are fundamentally insatiable, i.e. 
their expectations, more or less explicitly formulated, always tend to exceed what reality 
can offer them and, as a result, bring about disappointment (they may try to conceal it in 
front of other people and themselves, but it is bound to appear). 
Two points regarding the scope of Hirschman’s analysis are in order here. 
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Firstly, Hirschman did not try to provide an axiological comparison of the two varieties 
of VA: in contrast, for instance, to Hannah Arendt, who proposed several arguments for 
the superiority of public VA over private VA,1 he did not try to ‘rank’ these two varieties 
of VA. One may conjecture that his psychological theory of the essential ‘insatiability’ of 
human nature—insatiability ineluctably leading to disappointment—implies that none of 
them is obviously higher than the other. However it may be, it is clear that the author’s 
analysis of the “shifts” between these two varieties of VA is, above all, descriptive. It is 
worth mentioning here that this (descriptive) analysis is further supplemented in his other 
book, namely The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before 
Its Triumph, with insightful historical remarks on the relations between the private and the 
public spheres. For instance, he identified three main reasons as to why the passage from 
the public to the private sphere came to be treated as legitimate (which happened in the 
17th and 18th century):  
(1) the pursuit of one’s private, material interests started to be viewed as beneficial 
to the material well-being of the society as a whole (this is the ‘Invisible Hand’-
type argument—an economic justification of capitalism);  
(2) the pursuit of private, material interests came to be regarded as providing coun-
terbalance for dangerous passions typical of the “life of intensive involvement 
with public affairs”, such as “ambition, envy, and the reckless pursuit of glory 
and power” (Hirschman, 1997, p. 7); consequently, a ‘spirit of commerce’, with 
its characteristic (in the view of many thinkers, e.g. Montesquieu or James 
Steuart) virtues of moderation, tranquility, and practical wisdom, was expected 
to diffuse into political life and make it more calm and balanced.  
The argument (2) is one of two forms of political justification of capitalism; the other form 
(invoked e.g. by James Steuart) is based on the (plausible) claim that the despotic govern-
ment is less likely to appear in the state in which the economy reached a high level of 
complexity, since any arbitrary (despotic) interference with it might lead to its destruction 
or at least to its serious disturbance (argument 3); the interference is even less likely to 
occur if, as was emphasised by Montesquieu, the right to the private ownership of property 
has become deeply entrenched in the society.2 
Secondly, Hirschman did not attempt to apply his theory of ‘shifting involvements’ to the 
analysis of the relations between VA and VC. Therefore, the question arises: can this the-
ory describe the transitions between VA and VC just as convincingly as it describes the 
                                                          
1 The most important of which seems to be her—undoubtedly controversial—claim that the values which can be 
realised in the former one, e.g. solidarity, impartiality, equality, courage, respect, and the value of realising one’s 
capacity for judgment, are higher than the values which can be realised in the latter one, e.g. intimacy, love, 
compassion, pity, goodness. 
2 The political arguments for capitalism were later criticised by, among others, Alexis de Tocqueville, who 
pointed out that the material well-being, with its concomitant phenomena (the focus on one’s wealth and the fear 
of losing it) may breed indifference to political life and make the appearance of some form of despotism (‘mild’, 
‘paternalistic’ despotism) more likely.  
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transitions between the two varieties of VA? Arguably, Hirschman’s theory can plausibly 
describe the passage from VA (in both its varieties) to VC (in either of its two forms). 
However, this theory seems much less plausible as an account of the passage in the reverse 
direction, especially from VC in the strong form to VA. I shall now proceed to analyse 
this problem (one that is crucial to this paper) at somewhat greater length.  
Hirschman wrote that the “world” he tried to “understand in this essay (Shifting Involve-
ments) is one in which men think they want one thing and then upon getting it, find out to 
their dismay that they don’t want it really as much as they thought or don’t want it at all 
and that something else, of which they were hardly aware, is what they really want” 
(Hirschman, 2002, p. 21). One could argue, however, that the “world” which Hirschman 
tried to understand is not the world of VC, or at least not the world of VC in the strong 
form. The classical thinkers, who developed the concept of VC in the strong form, admitted 
that human nature is insatiable and unsatisfiable, but they believed that it is its conditional 
feature: human nature is insatiable and unsatisfiable only if it seeks its fulfilment in the 
sphere of VA (they emphasised that a human being is, in his essence, a spirit which refers 
to the whole of reality and, as a result, cannot be satisfied by any particular part of it). The 
predicament of a human being focused on the material reality was expressed poignantly by 
Augustine of Hippo in Confessions (Book I, Chap. 1) in a memorable phrase: Quia fecisti 
nos ad te et inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te. But, as was believed by 
Augustine and other Christian thinkers, a human being can silence or appease this ‘disquiet 
of heart’ if he directs his gaze towards the God/Absolute/Logos/Transcendence. Accord-
ingly, VC (in the strong form) is the kind of life which should not breed disappointment: 
once we have become involved in it, we should feel no negative motivation (i.e. based on 
dissatisfaction/disappointment) to abandon it for the sake of another kind of life. In other 
words, there should not exist any endogenous motivation for abandoning VC in the strong 
form and, thereby, for getting involved in VA (though there may be, of course, various 
exogenous reasons, e.g. the necessity to defend one’s country against aggressors, to fight 
for social justice, or to support one’s relatives financially; all this could induce contempla-
tive people to pursue VA). The classical thinkers invoked two main arguments for their 
claim about the superiority of VC over VA: from self-sufficiency and from the essence of 
a human being. They were clearly expressed by Aristotle in Book 10 of Nicomachean Eth-
ics. He claimed, first, that contemplation exhibits self-sufficiency (autarkeia) more than 
any other human activity. He gave three different interpretations to this thesis:  
(1) in contrast to ethical virtues (such as, among others, courage or justice), it does 
not require other people (we can be just only towards other people, but we can 
contemplate the truth in solitude);  
(2) contemplation is much less dependent on the possession of external goods than 
any other activity, including the practice of ethical virtues (e.g. in order to be gen-
erous or just—in the sense of both distributive or commutative justice - we must 
have material goods; by contrast, contemplation can be practiced even by rela-
tively poor people);  
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(3) the value of ethical virtues is rooted partly in the beneficial effects they lead to, 
whereas the value of contemplation lies entirely ‘in itself’.  
Second, since he assumed that the ‘essence’ of a human being (i.e. his most typical feature 
that distinguishes him from other beings) is reason, he could assert that a human being’s 
fulfilment (and also pleasure) will be the greatest in this type of activity in which reason 
acts most purely, with the least possible admixture of corporeal passions; this type of activ-
ity is, of course, the contemplation of the truth. 
One must admit, however, that even according to the classical thinkers disappointment 
cannot be entirely excluded from VC, since our ‘earthly’ contemplation is not perfect—it 
is, as Thomas Aquinas put it in Summa Theologiae (II. II, q. 182, a. 2), quaedam inchoatio 
futurae felicitatis, only a kind of foretaste of the Eternal Beatitude; it cannot yield true 
happiness, vera felicitas, because, in our earthly life, it is, to some extent, corrupted by the 
temporary/transitory character of the human (terrestrial) existence. As Thomas Aquinas 
expressed it in Summa Theologiae (I. II, q. 5, a. 3): 
Naturaliter enim homo desiderat permanentiam eius boni quo habit. Bona autem praesentis 
vitae transitoria sunt, cum et ipsa vita transeat, quam naturaliter desideriamus et eam per-
petuo permanere vellimus, quia naturaliter homo refugit mortem. Unde impossibile est quod 
in haec vita vera beatitudo sit. 
Therefore, not only is contemplation difficult to reach (which by itself would not imply 
that it cannot bring vera felicitas), but it is also impossible to maintain for an arbitrary, 
indefinite length of time (a contemplative person, because he is also a ‘corporeal’ being, 
cannot avoid returning to ‘non-contemplative’ activities). It is precisely this combination 
of the difficulty and the transience/fleetingness of contemplative experiences that may 
give rise to disappointment. It is true that in the course of contemplation a human being 
has a unique experience of time: he feels as if he stepped out of it, but, I shall repeat, this 
experience is not durable (though, as was emphasised by the classical thinkers, especially 
by Aristotle in Book 10 of Nicomachean Ethics, this is the most durable/continuous of all 
the positive human experiences). But, interestingly, according to the classical thinkers, the 
very fact that we can have at all this kind of experience shows that our nature is not entirely 
mortal and that there is something divine to it. Thomas Aquinas wrote, for instance, that 
intellectus—a faculty of contemplation, as one may call it—is a faculty non propre hu-
mana, sed superhumana. A similar point about the quasi-divine—not fully natural for hu-
man beings—character of VC was made by Aristotle in the famous passage from the Book 
10, Ch. 7 of Nicomachean Ethics: 
[…] the activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems both to be superior in serious worth 
and to aim at no end beyond itself, and to have its pleasure proper to itself (and this augments 
the activity), and the self-sufficiency, leisureliness, unweariedness (so far as this is possible 
for man), and all the other attributes ascribed to the supremely happy man are evidently those 
connected with this activity, it follows that this will be the complete happiness of man, if it 
be allowed a complete term of life (for none of the attributes of happiness is incomplete). 
But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so far as he is man that he will live 
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so, but in so far as something divine is present in him […] If reason is divine, then, in com-
parison with man, the life according to it is divine in comparison with human life. But we 
must not follow those who advise us, being men, to think of human things, and being mortal, 
of mortal things, but must, so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve 
to live in accordance with the best thing in us; for even if it be small in bulk, much more does 
it in power and worth surpass everything. 
The above fragment from Aristotle, as well as the Christian thinkers’ belief that a perfect 
and, thereby, a really satisfactory VC can be pursued only in the afterlife, both imply that 
VC is not fully natural for human beings in their terrestrial life. But they also imply that 
contemplation is the least disappointing of all human experiences. Nonetheless, it may be 
disappointing, because, as was mentioned, it is both difficult and transitory. The less-than-
total perfection of our ‘earthly’ contemplation explains why human beings who are in-
volved in VC may indeed come to feel disappointed by this way of life and, as a result, 
may subsequently become involved in VA. However, what requires emphasis is the fact 
this disappointment does not come from the nature of VC (in the strong form); it is the 
result of an imperfection of human beings, who can rarely live up to this way of life and, 
if they do live up to it (and, thereby can really taste the moments of true contemplation), 
they (or, perhaps, most of them) cannot rest in it for a longer time. 
It should be added here that, according to Aristotle, the very fact that the capacity for 
contemplation is a divine element of human nature—‘divine’, since, as Aristotle empha-
sised, this is the only kind of activity which gods can pursue—was his another argument 
for the superiority of contemplation over other activities (including the practising of ethi-
cal—as opposed to dianoetic/intellectual—virtues). An important difference between the 
Greek and the Judeo-Christian visions of God can be seen here: for Greeks, God was above 
all intellect, whereas in the Judeo-Christian tradition God’s intellect is less emphasised—
for Jews God was primarily justice, while for Christians God was primarily love. Accord-
ingly, Aristotle’s argument ‘from’ the divine character of contemplation for the superiority 
of VC over VA becomes less convincing within the Judeo-Christian tradition, which as-
sumes that God not only contemplates, but also (or above all) performs ethical acts. 
To summarise, VC may indeed breed disappointment (which may, in turn, motivate a tran-
sition to VA), but it breeds disappointment not because of its nature; by its nature it does 
not ‘deceive’3 us, i.e. it does not raise the expectations which it cannot fulfil. It breeds 
disappointment only because of the limitations of our nature, which, because of its weak-
ness and rootedness in temporal existence, can rarely be fully and never continuously en-
gaged in VC. It is to be emphasised that the above conclusions, in so far as they stress the 
fact that VC is the least disappointing of all human experiences, refer in the first place to 
VC in the strong form. They refer in a much lesser degree to VC in the weak form, which 
is deprived of the metaphysical dimension and, thereby, cannot provide such a strong sense 
                                                          
3 The words ‘deception’ and ‘disappointment’ are etymologically related; in French, the word ‘déception’ con-
tinues to refer to both. 
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of fulfilment as VC in a strong form can. In other words, Hirschman’s psychological the-
ory seems to describe the passage from VC in the weak form to VA much better than from 
VC in the strong form to VA. However, as was argued above, this theory can also be 
helpful in the description of the latter transition. 
  
3. The Positive Motivational Links between vita contemplativa and vita activa 
In this section I will argue that VC (especially in the strong form) makes an agent who 
pursues it especially sensitive to external (exogenous) factors which justify the involve-
ment in the public/political life and, additionally, that the previous pursuance of VC makes 
his involvement in the public/political particularly effective.  
I shall start my argumentation with the following (rather uncontroversial) claim: the most 
precious psychological ground for pursuing public VA is a disinterested/selfless concern 
with the public happiness/good/interest. Now, it can hardly be doubted that this kind of 
motivation is strengthened by the involvement in VC, especially in its strong form (though, 
obviously, VC is not a necessary condition of having such a motivation): it was, in fact, 
part of definition of VC in its strong form that it is pursued in a self-forgetful manner, in 
the spirit of the love of reality. The second claim (one that is more controversial than the 
previous one) is that the agent who has developed selflessness through the involvement in 
VC and who, as a result, has what can be called an abundance of selflessness, will desire 
to ‘channel’ it by (selflessly) acting for the sake of other people.4 This action may take 
two forms: he may want contemplata aliis tradere, for instance by spreading the 
knowledge he has acquired through contemplation (this way of leaving the solitude of VC 
may still be regarded as part of VC), or he may want to act for the public good/happi-
ness/interest in a more tangible manner, i.e. by engaging in the public/political life, thus 
pursuing an activity which cannot be regarded as part of VC. Accordingly, VC is much 
more likely to give rise to an altruistic, ‘public’ motivation rather than to indifference to 
public/political affairs, as might be surmised at first glance and as was thought by many 
Roman citizens who were critical of Christianity (cf. Wilken, 2003; Ruggiero, 2007), and, 
later, by Niccolò Machiavelli and some other Renaissance thinkers, e.g. Coluccio Salutati, 
Leonardo Bruni, or Speron Speroni (cf. Garin, 1969; Domański, 1997; Berlin, 2013). But 
even in the works of the Italian public-oriented thinkers the critique is directed less against 
VC itself than against such a (distorted) understanding of it which justifies the inhuman 
isolation from other people as well as the contempt of the world. This understanding was 
distorted, because, let me repeat, VC as understood within classical tradition was based on 
the love of the reality—and not only of the supernatural but also of the ‘earthly’ reality. 
According to the classical understanding of contemplation (i.e. VC in the strong form), 
contemplation accompanied by contemptus mundi, i.e. indifference to the welfare of other 
                                                          
4 This claim was defended, for instance, by Henri Bergsons, who has argued (in his book Les Deux sources de 
la morale et de la religion) that it is a part of a definition of a true/perfect contemplation/mysticism that it will 
lead to an (altruistic) action. Thus, on this view, action is not a ‘weakening’ of contemplation but its final stage. 
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people, is simply a contradictio in adiecto. The distinction between these two ways—the 
non-isolationist and the isolationist—of understanding contemplation and the recognition 
that the isolationist one (i.e., deprived of the component of the love of reality) is distorted, 
can be found, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, in Machiavelli (who has an undeserved rep-
utation of being a stringent and one-sided critic of Christianity). In Discorsi sopra la prima 
deca di Tito Livi (Book II, II), he expressly wrote that Christianity leads to the contempt 
of worldly affairs and to the indifference towards the well-being of the country only if it 
is wrongly interpreted—in the spirit of ‘ozio’ (idleness, sloth); if it is properly understood, 
it does not undermine the civic engagement of citizens. 
Furthermore, it seems plausible to maintain that a person involved in VC (especially VC 
in the strong form) will act particularly effectively—bravely and non-opportunistically—
in the public sphere. The argument for this claim might run as follows. A person who lives 
VC in the strong form should become less fearful of death (and, thereby, less dependent 
on other people), because he does not consider the earthly life as the only life he has and/or 
because he exhibits a special sensitivity and attachment to ethical values (whose realisa-
tion he regards as his principal goal, overriding other goals). A contemplative person is 
also likely to have an especially valuable form of self-respect, viz. self-respect which is, 
to a large extent, independent of the recognition and appreciation by other people. This 
combination of inner freedom and self-respect allows him to be more faithful to his own 
conscience and to act more uncompromisingly in the world—uncompromisingly, but not 
fanatically (the love of reality excludes fanaticism: it gives rise to respect and also a certain 
kind of tenderness and compassion towards other people). One can give many historical 
examples of this kind of connection between pursuing VC and courage in VA: from Soc-
rates through the Stoic philosophers and Christians, who were especially brave in oppos-
ing vicious Roman emperors (their courage stood out particularly against the background 
of the cowardice of most Roman senators, entirely immersed in VA), to Mahatma Gandhi 
or Martin Luther King. This connection is worth emphasising, because it is rarely recog-
nised. According to the stereotypical image, a person leading VC is incapable of making 
decisions; exhibits intellectual over-subtlety, leading to skepticism; jealously guards his 
independence; values his inner freedom above all; is somewhat egocentric, timid, and pu-
sillanimous. It may not be accidental that this image became a stereotype: many intellec-
tuals did exhibit these features and either failed as politicians/public activists or distanced 
themselves from public activities.5 However, it would be implausible to maintain that 
there is a deeper connection between pursuing VC in the strong form and possessing the 
above features which lead to an awkward performance in the public/political life (though 
there may indeed be such connection between pursuing VC in the weak form—being an 
‘intellectualist’, but not a ‘contemplative’ person in the strong sense—and having these 
features). The opposite seems to be true, namely that there is a deeper connection between 
VC in the strong sense and independence and courage in the public/political life. This 
                                                          
5 Like, for instance, Erasmus from Rotterdam, at least as presented in the excellent biography by Stefan Zweig, 
in which the author expressed his admiration for Erasmus’ intellectual qualities, but reproved him for not having 
enough determination and courage to act more resolutely in the public life. 
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connection, as mentioned, was not often acknowledged. However, it was noticed and de-
scribed insightfully by at least two thinkers, i.e. Gilbert K. Chesterton and Clive Staples 
Lewis. The former one wrote (in a somewhat exaggerated manner) that:  
Lenin only fell into a slight error [in repeating Marx’s words that religion is the opium of the 
people—WZ]; he only got it the wrong way round. The truth is that irreligion is the opium 
of the people. Wherever the people do not believe in something beyond the world, they will 
worship the world. But, above all, they will worship the strongest thing in the world. And, 
by the very nature of the Bolshevist and many other modern systems, as well as by the prac-
tical working of almost any system, the State will be the strongest thing in the world. (Ches-
terton, 1932, p. 59) 
The latter one, in turn, claimed that:  
Hope is one of the theological virtues. This means that a continual looking forward to the 
eternal world is not (as some modern people think) a form of escapism or wishful thinking, 
but one of the things a Christian is meant to do. It does not mean that we are to leave the 
present world as it is. If you read history you will find that the Christians who did most for 
the present world were just those who thought most of the next The Apostles themselves, 
who set on foot the conversion of the Roman Empire, the great men who built up the Middle 
Ages, the English Evangelicals who abolished the Slave Trade, all left their mark on Earth, 
precisely because their minds were occupied with Heaven. It is since Christians have largely 
ceased to think of the other world that they have become so ineffective in this. Aim at Heaven 
and you will get earth “thrown in”: aim at earth and you will get neither. It seems a strange 
rule, but something like it can be seen at work in other matters. Health is a great blessing, 
but the moment you make health one of your main, direct objects you start becoming a crank 
and imagining there is something wrong with you. You are only likely to get health provided 
you want other things more—food, games, work, fun, open air. In the same way, we shall 
never save civilisation as long as civilisation is our main object. We must learn to want 
something else even more. (Lewis, 2014, pp. 73–74) 
The above considerations demonstrate that there is no necessary tension between VA (in 
its public form) and VC (especially in the strong form). What is more, VC seems to be a 
desirable complement of VA (in its public form), not only (as argued above) because VC 
provides a proper motive for the involvement in the public sphere and public action is 
likely to be more effective (pursued more courageously and uncompromisingly) if moti-
vated by unselfish motives developed within VC, but also because the involvement in the 
public sphere motivated in this way is likely to be more lasting than if it were propelled 
by disappointment with the pursuit of private, material interests.  
 
4. Conclusions 
Let me summarize. VC in the strong form is much less prone to disappointment than VA 
in both its varieties (though, given the imperfections of the human nature and the transito-
riness of human experiences, it is not entirely immune to disappointment). This psycho-
logical fact might be treated as an argument for the claim that VC stands higher in the 
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hierarchy of the ways of life than VA. Two features of VC in the strong sense—selfless-
ness and otherworldliness (understood broadly, i.e. not necessarily in the strictly religious 
sense, but rather as a sensitivity to, and the recognition of, the metaphysical dimension of 
reality)—make VC a desirable complement of VA (in its public form): the involvement in 
the public sphere motivated by VA is likely to be not only more effective but also more 
durable than the involvement propelled by disappointment with the private VA. Therefore, 
it is implausible to maintain that there are two rarely interpermeating categories of human 
beings: those who are ‘psychologically destined’ for VC and those who are ‘psychologi-
cally destined’ for VA. The opposite thesis seems to be true: there exist strong motiva-
tional links in the direction from VC to VA.  
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